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Book Review
MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW. Credos of Sixteen American
Scholars. Boston: Law Book Company, 1941. Pp. xii,
321. $5.00.
Published under the direction of the Julius Rosenthahl
foundation at Northwestern University, this volume con-
tains the legal credos of sixteen leading American scholars
as written in response to a letter of invitation to partici-
pate. Each writer was asked to set forth in a limited num-
ber of pages of text (no footnotes) his philosophy of the
law. The idea was to produce a written symposium of con-
temporary American legal philosophies by having directed
at the same topic the "views of American thinkers on the
ultimate ideas of the origin, nature, and ends of the law".
The label "philosophy of law" was used in its wide sense to
include "ideas of a fundamental nature bearing on the law
as an institution common to all human societies" but not
including "any statement, however complete, or however
well organized, of actual legal rules or doctrines". With
this much direction only, the selected "prime donne" (as
the preface calls them) of theoretical jurisprudence in the
United States were set to their task.
The result appears as a series of sixteen essays running
from nine pages of print for the shortest to twenty-two
pages for the longest with an average of fourteen pages.
Each essay is preceded by a full page portrait of the author
and another separate page containing in the center a brief
identification, setting forth the author's birthplace and
date, general education, present connection, and a more or
less detailed statement (varying with each author) of his
other writings. The type is large and legible on cream
colored paper with rough edges, and the book is attractively
bound in a brown leather-looking binding with gold letter-
ing so as to make an attractive desk or study volume. As
one reviewer has commented, the gift of such an expensive
looking volume makes one conscience bound to read it
before reviewing it, a practice not always indulged in.
The contributing authors are composed of one law
professor-practitioner, two philosophy professors, and thir-
teen law professors. Some lament has arisen over the ab-
sence from the work of any contribution from the judiciary.
If, as was so in the case of one judge who reviewed the
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book, this resulted from judicial refusal to accept invita-
tions to participate, the publishers are not to blame; al-
though, the lack remains and is regrettable. Perhaps it will
be remedied by a companion volume of sixteen judicial
philosophies of the law, if sixteen American jurists can be
found willing to participate in such a work. Production of
such a volume would do more than the present one in the
development of abstract thought where there is at present
a noticeable lack of it.
Aside from the lack of representation of the bench, the
assemblage of scholars in the instant work should be enough,
of itself, to recommend the book to the law reading public.
It has stimulated a number of interesting reviews, some
adding bits of philosophy to what is expressed in the work,
some classifying or attempting to simplify the philosophies
of the authors, some providing delightfully humorous read-
ing in their light treatment of matters philosophical, and
one criticizing in biting fashion the efforts of the contribu-
tors. This reviewer feels that a brief survey of each phil-
osophy will enable the reader to decide whether or not to
read further before passing judgment. The reviewer felt
the book very worth-while.
JOSEPH WALTER BINGHAm, law, Stanford University.
While recognizing the various possible numerous meanings
of the word law, this self-styled iconoclast and realist dis-
cusses law "in the sense of the field of our professional
study". As such, law consists of the concrete functioning
of government; and, the lawyer's business is to forecast as
accurately as he can possible governmental action with ref-
erence to his client's affairs. The cases in all their concrete-
ness of cause and effect are the very substance of the law.
One must be aware that the causes of judicial decisions are
not always stated and are often inaccurately stated in the
opinions. However, real ability goes beyond the pure tech-
nique of a lawyer and calls for an understanding of eco-
nomic, social, and political prejudices, forces and purposes.
Throughout, the emphasis is on men and not rules. As in
any science, or philosophy, or art, the rules and principles
are but tools of thought. "Any philosophical theory of gov-
ernment, any political or social tenet, any juristic postulate
is especially relative and provisional."
Moms R. COHEN, philosophy, College of the City of
New York. Despairing of referring to all the elements of a
philosophy of law in so short a space, this philosopher says
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he will confine himself to discussing "how the principle of
polarity, of the mutual dependence of opposing principles,
can help us to deal with some current dichotomies in our
field". After a clear statement of the need for both induc-
tion and deduction in legal, as in other, thinking, he empha-
sizes that the principle of polarity means that neither the
logical vs. the existential, nor what the law should be vs.
what it is, are mutually exclusive. Law and justice are to
be neither wholly identified or wholly divorced. The legal
order, if it is to preclude violations through fraud, criminal
violence, and rebellion should promote a maximum attain-
able satisfaction to all groups. Some determination of the
problem of the ultimate aims of the law and the extent to
which it can influence human fate is important (but space
did not allow for elaboration).
WALTER WHEELER COOK, law, Northwestern University.
The primary aim of Cook's philosophy is to examine the
problems of the lawyer, the judge, the law teacher, and the
legal investigator "from the point of view of the logic of in-
quiry developed by modern science". His "scientific em-
piricism" incorporates as a single method mathematics and
"logic" on the one hand and experimentation on the other.
Referring to his other writings for elaboration of his gen-
eral point of view, Cook seeks to emphasize in this essay
that his method of inquiry can be utilized in developing a
theory of values. At beginning and end, he disclaims any
ability or attempt to state a philosophy of law in the space
provided; but he concludes that use of his scientific method
can work out a better legal philosophy than most current
ones.
JOHN DEWEY, philosophy, emeritus, Columbia Univer-
sity. Dewey starts with the assumption that an examina-
tion of the controversies of the various schools as to the
nature of law reveals that the question breaks down into
three issues, the: (a) source, (b) end, and (c) application
of law, including under the last the methods by which law
is and can be made effective. He seems to reduce all three
to the problem of what the law ought to be or the working
out of a theory of values. From then on the essay seems
devoted to demonstrating the soundness of the same scien-
tific approach of Cook. The source, end, and application of
law are to be discovered within the system by proper meth-
ods of scientific inquiry. "The standpoint taken is that law
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is through and through a social phenomenon, social in
origin, in purpose or end, and in application."
JOHN DICKINSON, law, University of Pennsylvania (also
general counsel of the Pennsylvania Railroad). This essay
is one of the few attempts to state a complete legal philos-
ophy and in its compactness must be read to be fully appre-
ciated. The author traces the growth of law as one of the
incidents of the growth of civilization. The friction of peo-
ple living in communities is avoided only by custom and
habit and the willingness of individuals to follow authority.
But to avoid arbitrary control, authority must act through
rules. This enables individuals to plan their transactions
and subjects governmental action to the control of rational
processes. Dickinson criticizes the realists for their effort
to break down these processes (which many realists would
claim they do not mean to do) and suggests that some re-
cent juristic theories of "flexible intelligence" in govern-
ment are but a return to the days of government by phil-
osopher-kings. He suggests an external source for the con-
tent of rules such as custom, the law of nature, or "ideal"
law. Law grows through legislation and judicial decision.
Constitutional protection coupled with judicial review are
desirable safeguards against arbitrary government.
LON L. FuLLER, law, Harvard University. Reflecting on
the difficulty of determining one's shifting philosophy,
Fuller prefers to state what he dislikes about the present
order. He criticizes the "literary tradition" of confining
legal study to a traditionally defined body of legal mate-
rials. He would prefer more emphasis on the fields now re-
served for graduate study (if any) such as the great classics
of natural law, the general history of legal ideas and their
relation to intellectual movements of the past; comparative
law; the legal implication of psychology; economics and
sociology. He also dislikes that attitude which sees salva-
tion in the application of the methods of natural science.
This leads him to a discussion of the controversy between
rationalism and irrationalism where he reveals what Cook
laments, namely that much criticism of the methods of "sci-
entific empiricism" relates to a much narrower method
than that which Dewey and Cook expound. It is easy to
agree with Fuller that "we must have a good metaphysics
before we can have a good politics", but the controversy
(which Fuller leaves untouched) seems to be on the extent
to which the former is discoverable within the social order.
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LEON GREEN, law dean, Northwestern University. Dean
Green postulates that the base of society is activity. Out of
activity comes power, which must be controlled. Many
controls exist in religion, the family, civic clubs, trade
groups, etc.; but, for its more important interests, society
controls through formal political government. Along with
formal government comes law. While it has many phases,
all of which must be embraced in a philosophy of law, there
are three main elements: (1) Wisdom, (2) Power, (3)
Process. Since wisdom grows out of all social activities,
and power is generated through all of them "any satisfying
philosophy of law must therefore be found in a philosophy
of the total social organism of which law is only one phase".
The social organism needs a body of highly trained men to
control it,-justifying the training of lawyers. Problems
of government increase with the complexities of growing
society. Growth has just begun.
WALTER B. KENNEDY, law, Fordham University. This
writer sees a real struggle emerging in America between
two polar and antithetical theories of law which may be
Scholasticism vs. Realism. Scholasticism is a way of life
and law which recognizes natural law and that a Divine
Being is its author, believing in universal truths and im-
perishable concepts, discoverable by the reason of Man.
Realism is a philisophy of law which finds no place for
natural law or immutable rights, which makes much of the
facts of life and deems them more important than prin-
ciples of law, which elevates behaviour rather than reason
as the motivating factor in judicial opinions. Having es-
tablished his schools, Kennedy proclaims loudly his faith
in Scholasticism and his hatred for and distrust of Realism
which he blasts as the stated faith of the dictators of Europe.
Reconciliation of schools of thought envisaged by Cohen,
Llewellyn, Radin, and others in this book seems lost in this
essay.
ALBERT KoCOUREK, law, Northwestern University. After
several pages spent with the mathematical and other scien-
tific philosophers in order to prove that all is not what it
seems and if it is, it shouldn't be, Kocourek informs us that
the world of reality transcends our experience and the
world of appearance, which we live in, is "Many". The
postulates of this fatalistic belief are summarized in "There
is no space, change, time, causality, or free will". The
consequences for legal philosophy are that "aesthetics and
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ethics are illusions built on illusions comparable in law to
presumptions based on presumptions". "Natural law and
an ultimate standard of justice, which even conventional
reason must recognize as mere construction of practical
ideals created by the human mind are examples of illusion
on illusion". Belief in this may lead some to a "eudaemon-
istic, or perhaps hedonistic pessimism, or a kind of anarchic
quietism"; but for others, "it may lead to a more under-
standing attitude toward the universe and a saner view of
life". The reviewer must admit that he found most agree-
ment with the author's concluding quote from the grave-
digger in Hamlet: "'Cudgel thy brains no more about it,
for your dull ass will not mend his pace with beating' ".
K. N. LLEWELLYN, law, Columbia University. This is
one of the most complete philosophies in the volume. Its
wise author prefaces his remarks with what, for many
years, has seemed to this reviewer to be true and which
assumes increasing validity from the essays in this volume,
namely that "one large portion of the disputes among jur-
isprudes loses much of its meaning if the phases of law
which are particularly dear to one and another of the com-
batants are put each into relation with law as a whole".
After this he analyzes law as a going institution in society
involving rules and principles, an ideology, methods, and a
host of law-men. As such, it has two points of orientation:
(1) Its job to do; and, (2) Its results in life by which it is
tested. The jobs are five: (1) The disposition of the trouble
case; (2) The preventive channeling of conduct and effec-
tive reorientation thereof; (3) The allocation of authority
and the arrangement of procedures which mark action as
being authoritative; (4) The positive side of law's work as
a whole, the net organization of society to provide integra-
tion, direction, and corrective; (5) Juristic method-the
task of handling materials, tools, and people to the end of
doing the jobs better and better. In elaborating this, Llew-
ellyn displays much more than the realist of Kennedy's
fears. He may be Cook's scientific empiricist?
UNDERHILL MOORE, law, Yale University. This writer
seems to be seeking a philosophy of law composed of "oper-
ational" theories or at least theories from which verifiable
(operational) hypotheses may be deduced. "Operational"
describes a "theory every proposition of which may be veri-
fied directly, or indirectly through another proposition,
either by a contrived experiment or, as in geology, by ob-
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servation of a process without such an experiment". With-
out such precise knowledge of the effects of law on be-
havior "any discussion of the relative desirability of alter-
native social ends which may be achieved by law is largely
day-dreaming and any discussion of the 'engineering' meth-
ods by which law may be used to achieve those ends is
largely futile". The theory, construction and experimenta-
tion in his paper attempts to establish a method for obtain-
ing such precise information. It is not susceptible of brief
description.
EDWIN W. PATTERSON, law, Columbia University. Rec-
ognizing that traditional jurisprudence has concerned itself
more with the internal order and function of law, Patter-
son chooses to consider it in its external relations with
government, with society, and with justice. The relation
with government is the only indispensable one; for, law
may be unjust, and it may be ill adapted to the society it
serves (at least temporarily). Patterson regrets the dele-
gation to political scientists (or any others) of the develop-
ment of conceptions of state sovereignty and government.
He emphasizes that the conflicts in society set the problems
of social controls of which law is only one, and that to
understand these conflicts and their solution, one must be
aware of all of the characteristics of man in society. Law
is a useful instrument of social control largely because of
man's capacity for reasoning coupled with his capacity for
justice. It is difficult for the author to convey his idea of
justice, however, other than as being a right way of doing
things more in terms of operations and immediate ends
than of any ultimate ends. This makes a well-rounded essay.
RoscoE POUND, former law dean, Harvard University.
Pound states that law may be used to describe: (1) the
"regime" or "legal order" of a developed politically organ-
ized society; or (2) the rules of decision or guidance from
which one predicts official action in that society; or (3) the
judicial and administrative process through which the rules
are applied, any of which call for system and order. De-
spite certain philosophies of futility, it is important to dis-
cover the task of the law. Ethics, economics, political sci-
ence, psychology, sociology, history, and philosophy may
be looked to for help. Nineteenth century jurists concerned
themselves chiefly with the nature of law, the interpreta-
tion of legal history, and the relation of law and morals,
with confusion resulting from embracing too much in the
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one word, law. Today the most important problem is the
theory of interests. A legal system attains the ends of the
social order by: (1) recognizing certain interests individ-
ual, public and social, (2) defining the limits within which
those interests shall be recognized legally and given effect
through legal precepts, and (3) endeavoring to secure the
interests so recognized within the defined limits. This must
include working out principles for valuation of interests.
Pound concludes with an expression of faith in the tradi-
tional methods of Anglo-American law, with a bow to the
practitioner.
THOMAS REE PowErL, law, Harvard University. Dis-
avowing any philosophy of law, and having no desire to
acquire a formal one, Powell would never have thought to
inquire as to the historical origin of law (he doesn't con-
sider "origin" as meaning the source of its authority), and
he is convinced that it has many "natures" and many
"ends". His philosophy is simply realistic, as he is willing
to avow if it does not exclude "that ideas general and par-
ticular are potent influences on the minds -of men". Judging
from the single court which he has studied most, it is neces-
sary to know doctrine but also to be aware that it doesn't
always determine the result. Some judges adhere to a
consistent social pattern. Others don't. Powell wants to be
broad-minded and practical, he doesn't want to be partic-
ular or rigid about legal philosophy.
MAX RADIN, law, University of California. After an-
nouncing that he proposes to discuss the science of legal
values, this author confines himself considerably to a de-
scription of the factors, legal and non-legal which enter into
the formation of legal judgments. These judgments are the
actions of a host of judges, magistrates, and administrative
or executive officials who bind others by their rulings.
They are largely influenced by an attempt to conform to
two things: (1) the orderly arrangement of past judgments
(the legal taxonomy of statutes, judgments, past rules,
etc.), and (2) accepted doctrines of social behavior in the
very society from which the judge comes. Difficulty arises
chiefly when there are conflicting patterns to cover an un-
usual act. The science of law is, therefore, "that organized
examination of all the data that affect social conduct which
will enable us to predict what evaluation in the sense of
'ought' or 'may' a judge will make of some conduct which
is a little outside of usual patterns". We find judges in-
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clined by their origin and training to disregard those ele-
ments of social life not already formulated in past doctrine,
but likewise swayed to conform to changing mores of the
community and to be guided by that "particular moral
quality 'justice' ". The essay concludes with interesting
reflections on the opposites with which justice must deal.
JOHN H. WiGMORE, law, Northwestern University. This
scholar confines his contribution to an analysis and sub-
division of legal science from the point of view of "the ob-
jective of our thinking about law at a particular moment".
He states that law may be regarded as: (1) A thing to be
ascertained as (a) the actual "positive" law of a given
moment (statutes, decisions, customs, etc.), (b) its history
and development, or (c) its relation to other sciences; (2)
A thing to be questioned as by a standard of (a) logic, (b)
ethics, or (c) economics (or other policies of social wel-
fare); (3) A thing to be taught; and (4) A thing to be made
and enforced, as by (a) the judicial function, (b) the legis-
lative function. He submits that clarity of thought will be
materially aided by knowing which one or more of these
several branches of the science is under consideration at
any given moment. Perhaps one should re-read the book
after this essay.
Doubtless, this book will continue to raise various re-
sponses as to the value of legal philisophy. If it feeds at all
the growing appreciation in American jurisprudence of the
value of abstract thought, it will have achieved a worth-
while purpose. There will be those who will be left with a
feeling of futility after having read it. This feeling should
be checked carefully to discern whether it is an honest ap-
praisal of what is in the book or whether it is a retreat from
the difficult task of thinking through a philosophy of one's
own. We inevitably make decisions as a result of our phil-
osophy (our personal attitude toward life). If we have
that philosophy without being conscious of it, it is only a
result of our own very limited experience, and may not
properly weigh all of that. If we have given conscious ef-
fort to its development, it may include some of the experi-
ence and wisdom of others.
-- G. KENNETH REIBLICH.*
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law.
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